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Case No. 88034-3-CA 
Priority #2 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgement and Order 
of the Twelfth (now Seventh) Circuit Court 
County of San Juan, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, presiding. 
LYLE ANDERSON, Attorney* 
for the City of Monticello 
Respondant 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 
84535 
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Appellant 
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Evanston, Wyoming 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr, Christensen will ammend his statement of facts to reflect 
the fact that the City of Monticello never did enter "defendants 
exhibit B" (a letter from the Department of Public Safety), 
into evidence, as Monticello has claimed in itTs Brief. The 
defendant, Mr. Christensen, has been denied his status as impecunious 
and therefore he can not supply transcripts to the Court, as 
he honestly has no funds with which to pay for them, therefore, 
the record will have to suffice. Mr. Christensen's memory is 
that the evidence was entered, but if it was not, as Mr. Anderson, 
(Monticello) claims, Mr. Christensen is willing to ammend his 
facts to reflect that. That being the case, there was no other 
evidence entered into the record to support the claim that Mr. 
Christensen1s license was ever suspended. Driving on the highways 
of this state is not a crime. Monticello agrees, with Mr. Christ-
ensen did enter an Abstract of his Wyoming license (defendant's 
exhibit A.) showing his staus "clear". He did therfore, successfully 
refute the charge of Driving while Suspended. 
However, this is an issue which has far reaching CONSTITUTIONAL 
issues, Namely, State's Rights. Further it appears to be an 
issue of "first impression" in the state of Utah. 
The residency issue has never come up before now, and this 
is not the proper time to raise it. 
Mr. Christensen did file his brief in this Court timely 
as is evidenced by the Clerk's stamp showing filing on December 
16, 1988. If it was not mailed to Monticello until the 20th 
(which Mr. Christensen doubts) it is not damaging to his appeal 
«--.- nr„\ D„I^ 0 „?
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal rising out of a criminal case, in which 
a Constitutional issue is raised, giving this Court Jurisdiction 
under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules 
3 and k of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) The City of Monticello has introduced no evidence that 
Mr. Christensen's license was suspended on the date in question. 
(2) The state of Utah has no power or authority to suspend 
or revoke a license granted by the state of Wyoming (Art. IV § 1 
U.S. Constitution,) 
(3) Under the "reciprocal agreements" onlynhome states" 
have the authority to suspend* or revoke the licenses granted 
by them, and there is a proscribed procedure to accomplish it. 
Utah did not follow that procedure, and Mr. ChristensenTs license 
was never suspended, making him innocent of violating UC 41-
2-28. 
(4.) The State of Utah must give full faith and credit to 
the priviledges granted by the state of Wyoming. 
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SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO ARGUEMENTS SET OUT IN RESPNDANTS BRIEF 
The arguments that are presented in this appeal are definately 
of a Constitutional nature, as well as a challenge to the Validity 
of the statute (UC 41-2-28) in it!s current application. This 
issue is a case of first impression in the State of Utah and 
as such the Utah Court of Appeals does have the proper Jurisdiction. 
The State of Utah has the power to suspend the licenses 
of residents of the State of Utah, who are licensed within the 
state of Utah, but the only way in which they can suspend the 
license of a resident of another state is to contact the licensing 
authority of the state in which the individual has residence 
with notification of the violation, so that the home jurisdiction 
can take the appropriate steps to suspend the license. 
Wyoming, Mr. Christensen!s home state, was not at the time 
in question a party state to the "Driverfs License Compact", 
but it did have in force itfs own reciprocal agreement (WS 31-9-204) 
Had Utah properly suspended Mr. Christensenfs license been properly* 
'guapeird^ dr, the state of Wyoming would have been aware of it 
and would have taken the steps to suspend Mr. Christensen!s 
license. Defendants exhibit A ( Abstract of Wyoming License) 
clearly shows this was not done. Utah has no power of it!s 
own over the licenses and priveledges (or acts) of Wyoming. 
If it did there would be no purpose in the "DriverTs License 
Compact" or reciprocal agreements of any kind. 
If the proper procedure had been followed, Mr. Christensen?s 
license would have been properly suspended, but it wasnft, and 
such arbitrary action on the part of Utah is a direct violation 
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of Wyoming's rights as a soveriegn state of the Union. 
RESPONSE TO ARGUEMENTS SET OUT IN RESPONDANT'S BRIEF 
I. The defendant/appellant, Mr. Christensen, has repeatedly 
challenged the Constitutionality and validity of the Statute 
he was charged with (UC 41-2-28), as it relates solely to this 
case. Mr. Christensen understands that he is not a law-trained 
individual, and that his arguements may not be as clear or con-
cise as an attorney's might be, however his callange has always 
been clear. The issue is and always has been an issue of State!s 
Rights, which is clearly constitutional in nature, and in the 
validity of this particular statute in the instant application. 
Mr. Christensen, realizes that UC 4-1-2-28 may be both Constitutional 
and valid in the proper application, but in this issue it is 
neither valid or Constitutional. The state of Utah, here, assumes 
that it can arbitrarily suspend a priviledge or license granted 
by the state of Wyoming, without following the proscribed procedure 
set out to inform the state of Wyoming of the violation, so 
that Wyoming could actually suspend Mr. Christensenfs license. 
The "Driver?s License Compact" is very clear when it states 
that only the "home state has the power to suspend the license 
of a non-resident. Mr. Christensen ha s in every Court presented 
an Abstract of his Wyoming license, showing that it was not 
only valid at the time of arrest, but at least THREE years previous 
to it, thereby challenging the validity of the statute. Further 
he has always maintained that Utah has no power to suspend 
his license. Therefore he has raised a Constitutional issue. 
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To assume that Utah has such power over acts of another state 
would be in direct violation of Article IV §1 &2 of the U. S. 
Constitution. Further if Utah is found to have such power, 
what would stop a state from suspending, annulling, or withdrawing 
mariage licenses, divorces, property deeds, or any other act 
of another state? It was for that very reason that thf£ particular 
article was included in the Constitution. 
Therefore, Mr. Christensen has raised the Constitutional 
issue in more than a "pro forman manner. Further Mr. Christensen 
beleives that this is a case of First Impression in the State of 
Utah, and for these reasons bel#£ves this case is properly before 
the Court. 
II. In the Respondantfs Brief, Mr. Anderson of the City of 
Monticello, has tried to raise the question of Mr. ChristensenTs 
residency in the State of Wyoming. Monticello does not claim 
that this issue was ever raised before, and indeed it was not. 
This is not the proper time to raise it. 
If the Court allows themVto raise it now, Mr. Christensen 
claims residency in Wyoming under the definition to BlackT s 
Law dictionary, 4-th Edition. Mr. Christensen has merely provided 
the court with his fatherTs address for the Court?s convenience 
due to his often transient life-style. Montiicillo has produced 
no evidence to the contrary, nor can they. 
The defendant's reliance on case law he presented is not 
"misguided" as Monticello claims. 
The statute quoted in State vs. French 117 NH 285, (at 
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786, 787) " Any person convicted of operating a motor vehicle 
in this state after his license to operate has been suspended 
or revoked shall be guilty of a misdeanor..."; is almost verbatim 
in the Utah Code 41-2-28, "Aperson whose operator's license 
has been suspended or revoked, who...drives any motor vehicle... 
while that license is supended or revoked, is guilty of a crime.." 
Neither is the definition of license expanded in the definitions 
found in UC 41-2-1(n), to meet the criteria set forth in the 
"French" case to qualify for conviction. The "French" case 
is explicit in that it states that the definition of "license" 
would have have to be expanded to include "non-residents operator's 
priviledge" in order to support conviction of "Driving on a 
suspendoa^ed License". 
Indiana vs. Churchill 388 NE 2nd 586 does not draw the 
distinction Monticello says it does, nor does the City of Monticello 
provide any case law, or statutory law to support it's claim 
that the legislature has removed the distinction between "license" 
and "priviledge". 
Further the rule of law in State vs. Roy, 176 A2d 66, 
which Monticello claims is is significant here is not as sig-
nificant as Monticello claims it is. Mr. Christensen, claims 
no "special Priviledges", nor any "greater priviledges" than 
those originally granted him by the state of Wyoming. It should 
be remembered that Mr. Christensen had a license issued by the 
by the State of Wyoming, long before the alleged "suspension" 
by the State of Utah. He did not obtain it in an attempt to 
evade the "suspension"-* as Monticello would lead you to beleive. 
The law that is definitive in "Roy" is that the Court did rule 
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that the defendant was entitled to the rights and priviledges 
granted by his "home state" within other states in the Union, 
particularly Indiana in that case. 
III. The City of Monticello claims that Utah has the power to 
suspend the "license" of a non-resident, and that they properly 
did so in this case, Monticellclclaims that power under the "DriverT s 
License Compact" (Sections 41-2-501 et seq. and tj@e "Non-residentT s 
Violator Compact" (Sections 41-2-601 e^ seq . ) If such power 
was indeed established by those statutes, the definition of 
"home state" found in Article ii §(b) of the "Drivers License 
Compact" would not include the phrase "...HOME State, ...The 
state which has issued and HAS THE POWER TO SUSPEND the. .license...f/ 
(emphasis added) If other states than the "home state" were 
intended to have such a power, then some indication of that 
would have to be mentioned, which it!s not. Clearly there is 
nothing within the "Compact" to prohibit Utah from suspending 
the license of a Wyoming resident because that prohibition is 
already quite clearly laid out in the U.S. Constitution Article 
IV §1 and 2, and no further prohibition need be given, as the 
legislature may not pass a law contrary to the U.S. Constitution. 
It might be additionally noted here that nothing in the "Compact" 
gave Utah that power either. 
Mr. Christensen has not claimed any protection under the 
Constitution of Wyoming, merely quoted from Wyoming?s Constitution 
that Wyoming has indeed admitted into the Union, which gave 
it full entitlement, equal to the state of Utah, and gave itfs 
residents the protection of the U. S. Constitution. 
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If it is true that the City of Monticello did not introduce 
into evidence the letter entitled "defendants Exhibit Bn, as 
the City has claimed, then Monticello has fail€e| to present 
any evidence that Mr. Christensen!s license was ever suspended 
ati all. Therefore this case should have beeen dismissed long 
ago. 
The state of Utah does not have the power to suspend Mr. 
Christensen!s license, but can inform Wyoming of conviction 
of a crime which would result in Wyomings suspension of the 
licenses under Wyoming statutes 31-7-124- & WS 31-9-204. As 
evidenced by the Abstract of Mr. Christensen1s License from 
the state of Wyoming, Utah never did take the steps available 
to acheive that suspension. If they had, Wyoming would have 
not only noted the commmnication, but would have suspended the 
license too. The abstract, however, lists his license status 
as "clear". 
Not only does Utah not have the power to arbitrarily suspend 
the license of a non-resident licensed in his home state, it 
did not properly take the steps neccessary to do so, in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Christensen has properly brought this issue before 
this Court, and has properly argued both the Constitutionality 
and the validity of the statute, in it's current application. 
To decide that the State of Utah has the power to suspend a license 
issued by any other state, would set a dangerous precedent in 
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in law, 
Mr. Christensen has not entered into this case frivolously 
but boes firmly beleive in the issue he brings. Therefore, 
no costs can be taxed in this case pursuant to Rule 34 of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. ("No Cost will be taxed in a criminal 
case"). Mr. Christensen wishes his conviction overturned and 
his property (money) returned to him, with interest. 
Respectfully submitted 
Ck vwa^c^^ K „ 
Lee Christensen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify tfejflfcfc a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Reply Brief was mailed to the opposing counsel, by placing four 
copies in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to Lyle 
Andereon, Monticello City Attorney, P.O. Box 275 MOnticello, 
Utah on the \ (r, day of Febuary, 1989-
